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Peter Huber's Liability is both a chronicle and a critique of
the modern tort system, written principally for an audience of lay
readers. The book does not break new ground theoretically, nor
does it contain much factual information that will be unfamiliar to
torts scholars. Rather, its objective is to explain to the uninitiated
how modern doctrinal innovations increasingly favor plaintiffs over
defendants, and to argue generally that the ensuing growth of tort
liability has imposed a variety of costs on the economy that far
exceed its benefits.
As a chronicle, the book succeeds nicely, introducing the lay
reader in witty and entertaining fashion to most of the important
innovations in tort doctrine during the twentieth century. Huber
begins with the "death of contract,"1 discussing the demise of priv-
ity as a limitation on the scope of duty, the growth of implied war-
ranty law, and the increasing rejection of express contractual dis-
claimers as a limitation upon liability. He then considers the
movement from negligence to strict liability in products actions
and the general refusal of the courts to accept compliance with in-
dustry custom or regulatory standards as a defense to tort claims.
The growth of toxic tort actions receives considerable attention
throughout the book, with emphasis upon the relaxation of stand-
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I The seminal work is Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State, 1974).
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ards for proof of causation, the artful interpretation of statutes of
limitations to permit claims for exposure years earlier, and the
questionable techniques of statistical proof devised by plaintiff's
lawyers. Other topics include the movement from the traditional
contributory negligence defense to comparative fault, the increas-
ing importance of joint and several liability in various areas, and
the increasing incidence and magnitude of punitive damages and
damages for pain and suffering.
Although the exposition of modern doctrine is informative, the
accompanying critique is less successful. Huber's analysis is often
one-sided, offering no exposition of sensible opposing viewpoints
and largely ignoring the perceived deficiencies in prior law that
spurred doctrinal evolution. More importantly, Huber's proposed
reforms, principally a greater reliance upon contract and govern-
ment regulation, are undeveloped and subject to a number of obvi-
ous criticisms that Huber does not address. In the end, one sus-
pects that much of the critique of existing law is right-headed on
balance and that some manner of reform is in order on many is-
sues. But as Huber himself at times acknowledges, a return to the
good old days is not the answer. The other options for reform war-
rant far more thorough and critical discussion than Huber
provides.
I.
Huber begins his critique of the tort system with a listing of
various products and services that have become more, and in some
cases prohibitively, expensive as a result of the tort system. (p 4)2
He culminates this listing with the claim that tort liability "costs
American individuals, businesses, municipalities and other govern-
ment bodies at least $80 billion a year," (p 4) as if to suggest that
the sheer magnitude of that figure is evidence of a system gone
awry.3 But one cannot draw that inference from a statistic about
the aggregate value of tort awards and settlements. Accidents im-
pose considerable costs on society, particularly accidents that kill
or maim, and there are many such accidents each year. Any system
that provides compensation to a substantial number of these acci-
dent victims and their families inevitably entails a considerable
transfer of resources.
2 All parenthetical page references are to Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolu-
tion and Its Consequences (Basic, 1988).
3 Note that Huber's figure is not a net cost to the economy, but is in considerable part
a transfer from defendants to plaintiffs and lawyers.
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But as Huber correctly argues, tort judgments (or settlements
in lieu thereof) are hardly the only way to compensate the injured,
and assuredly not the most efficient way. Huber's statistics suggest
that for every dollar actually received by tort plaintiffs, one or two
dollars are consumed in legal fees, witness fees, administrative
costs, and the like, at least for certain categories of tort actions. (p
151) Hence, if the societal goal is simply to provide compensation
to the injured, or to promote "loss spreading," a closely related no-
tion, then the tort system is almost certainly inferior to alternative
public or private insurance arrangements. Defenders of the tort
system must reach beyond its compensatory function if they are to
craft a persuasive defense.
An arguable advantage of the tort system over alternative
compensation arrangements is its superior ability to indulge the
vindictive or retributive instincts of injured parties. Accident vic-
tims no doubt receive a certain amount of psychic gratification
from the imposition of a monetary penalty upon the party at fault,
even if the lawyers and experts walk away with half of it. But this
argument is at best a bit unseemly. Further, even where the party
at fault is nominally liable, the loss is often shifted in the end to an
insurance pool and the party at fault suffers no more than a pro-
spective increase in premiums. Finally, many recent extensions of
tort liability allow plaintiffs to reach defendants who do not appear
morally culpable.' For these reasons, the retributive function of
tort, like the compensatory function, provides at best an uncom-
fortable defense of the tort system.
Economic theory provides a more appealing defense, at least
up to a point. The economic perspective emphasizes the incentive
effects of tort liability-in particular, the effects of liability upon
the incentives for accident-avoidance behavior. At its heart, this
incentives-based justification for tort liability is simple indeed. Ac-
cidents are avoidable, but only at a cost, and measures to reduce
the likelihood of accidents should be undertaken only to the degree
that their marginal benefits exceed their marginal costs. Further, if
accident-avoidance behavior is to reflect a proper balancing of
costs and benefits, individuals whose behavior can affect the
probability or seriousness of accidents must somehow perceive the
costs and benefits of that behavior. A potential injurer who can
cause harm to another with impunity, for example, will perceive
" For example, product manufacturers are strictly liable for products with manufactur-
ing "defects," even when the defect could not have been detected before sale through the
exercise of reasonable care.
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the costs of greater care but not the benefits, and will thus behave
too carelessly. By contrast, potential injurers who must pay for the
injuries that they cause to others will perceive both the costs and
benefits of careful behavior and behave accordingly. Here enters
the tort system: To ensure that potential injurers balance the per-
tinent costs and benefits in deciding how to behave, the tort sys-
tem forces injurers to bear the costs of the harms that they cause
to others,5 at least if they fail to behave properly.6
To be sure, the observation that tort liability may favorably
affect accident-avoidance incentives cannot justify unbounded lia-
bility. Indeed, on their face, the remarks above justify liability only
for "compensatory" damages, which confront injurers with the ac-
tual costs of the harms that they cause. Likewise, one must always
inquire whether the imposition of tort liability will generate trans-
action costs or error costs that exceed any attendant benefits, will
create perverse incentives that reduce the level of safety, or will
produce unacceptable redistribution of wealth.
Huber's critique of the tort system crystallizes on these con-
cerns. As noted, he observes that the cost of administering the sys-
tem-lawyers' fees, witness fees, the costs of courts and jurors, and
so forth-may equal or exceed the amount of money received by
successful plaintiffs. (p 151) Standing alone, this fact does not
weaken the incentives-based justification for tort law, because the
effect of liability upon injurers' incentives turns not on the amount
received by victims, but on the amount paid by injurers. No incen-
tive is lost when the lawyers and expert witnesses collect a share.8
' Even if potential injurers are insured, the beneficial incentives created by tort liability
survive as long as insured parties expect their insurance premiums to adjust to reflect the
actuarial value of the risks that they create.
6 Obviously, this exposition ignores many complicating factors, such as the possibility
that victims as well as injurers can exercise care, the notion that only strict liability induces
injurers to adjust their "activity levels," and so on. A far more comprehensive and general
exposition of the economic framework may be found in William H. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard, 1987), and Steven Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accident Lauf (Harvard, 1987). The pioneering work of Guido Calabresi,
The Costs of Accidents (Yale, 1970), also provides much useful material.
Supracompensatory or "punitive" damages may induce excessive caution on the part
of injurers, although a negligence rule can avoid this danger if administered without error.
For a discussion of the proper (and quite limited) case for "punitive" damages under an
incentives based theory of tort law, see Landes & Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law, especially ch 6 (intentional torts) (cited in note 6).
8 That lawyers and other costs swallow up a large portion of plaintiffs' compensation
may, however, affect the incentives of potential plaintiffs. If they know that they will not be
fully compensated if injured by someone else (because of lawyers' fees, etc.), they may adopt
socially inefficient accident-avoidance measures. These incentives for prospective plaintiffs
to overprotect may be offset by juries' penchant for awarding excessive damages (although
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Huber nonetheless raises an important concern-the operation
of the tort system entails a considerable resource cost. The law-
yers, judges, jurors, experts, and even the plaintiffs and defendants
themselves could devote their efforts to other pursuits. The court-
rooms could be used for the prompt resolution of other disputes.
Although Huber provides nothing that might approximate an accu-
rate estimate of the social costs of running the tort system, his
data on the magnitude of legal fees,' witness fees, and the like sug-
gest that these costs aggregate to billions of dollars annually. If the
incentives-based justification for tort is to carry the day, we must
be convinced that the value of the incentives created by the system
exceeds the cost of the system itself. Huber is correct to remind us
of the issue.
Huber also contends that the tort system generates sizeable
error costs. Juries, he suggests, and even judges, lack the compe-
tence to resolve the complicated scientific and engineering issues
that they must often confront. (pp 109-12) Juries, especially, in-
dulge their compassion for the injured plaintiff by awarding gener-
ous damages even when the plaintiff's case on the law is flimsy or
nonexistent. (pp 119-20) Likewise, juries award excessive damages
for pain and suffering and all too often tack on inappropriate puni-
tive awards. (pp 127-32) The unfortunate consequences of these er-
rors, according to Huber, are manifest in many categories of cases.
Pharmaceutical companies incur liability for "defective" drugs
merely because a low probability side effect materializes during a
prudent course of treatment or because an unfortunate medical
condition develops coincidentally after ingestion of the drug. (pp
102-03) Chemical companies and others incur liability for toxic
wastes on the basis of fallacious statistical evidence. (pp 110-12)
Comparatively safe contraceptives are driven from the market, and
vaccine manufacturers are afraid to sell their wares. (pp 155-56)
Manufacturers of many types of products shy away from innova-
tions in product design that might enhance safety but invite liabil-
ity on the basis of their novelty. (pp 153-71) In the end, Huber
argues, the cost of many products and services increases substan-
tially, with no accompanying improvement in, and sometimes a
worsening of the incentives for safety. (pp 169-71)
Unfortunately, Huber's method of proof as to the existence of
error and its consequences is sometimes bald assertion, though to
this merely shifts the incentive to overprotect to prospective defendants).
' However, many would argue (some facetiously) that the social opportunity cost of the
typical lawyer's time is quite low.
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be sure such assertions have been made by others.10 His critique of
the toxic tort settlements involving Love Canal, Times Beach, and
other localities, for example, cries out for more thoughtful and bal-
anced exposition of the arguments on both sides. The same might
be said for his analysis of the DES cases, the Bendectin cases, the
asbestos cases, the cases imposing liability on the manufacturers of
Saturday night specials, and many others. Likewise, he tends to
sweep under the rug the cases that most commentators would find
correctly decided-for instance, the Dalkon Shield cases. Huber
thus creates the impression of rampant error by emphasizing only
the cases in which the arguments for the defense are comparatively
persuasive. Finally, Huber's claim that safety often suffers because
manufacturers are afraid to innovate or to market certain types of
products would benefit from some careful comparative analysis to
explore how conditions in the United States differ from those in
other developed countries.
Huber also exaggerates the extent to which juries may err or
indulge their whimsy. Trial judges can set a verdict aside or trim
the damages award. Multiple levels of appeal are usually available
as well, although to be sure they are costly. Where serious errors
arise, therefore, they must be the product of "error" at multiple
levels of the judicial process (perhaps in the form of an overly def-
erential standard of review), or must be insignificant enough that
appeal is not cost-justified.
Nonetheless, Huber is no doubt accurate in his claim that lia-
bility is imposed with some regularity where, on balance, theory
suggests it should not be. And, in those circumstances, the benefi-
cial incentives that liability can provide do not arise, and in fact
liability may become counterproductive. Again, Huber is correct to
raise the issue.
Another consequence of the growth in tort liability, Huber
suggests, is the "insurance crisis." (pp 133-52) Undeniably, many
types of liability insurance have, in recent years, become consider-
ably more expensive peri dollar of coverage, and some forms of cov-
erage have become altogether unavailable, at least temporarily.
The increasing magnitude and uncertainty of tort liability has no
o 1 do not mean to suggest that Huber never makes his case. His criticism of decisions
imposing liability for the low probability side effects of vaccines, for example, is telling, and
indeed these cases have been roundly criticized for some time. Consensus on the need for
action in this area has already resulted in the The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986, 42 USCA §§ 300aa-1 et seq (Supp 1988). A summary of the Act's provisions may be
found in Allen M. Lenchek, A Shot in the Arm, 3 Wash Law 24 (March/April 1989).
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doulh. had some considerable bearing upon these developments.11
Thus, Huber argues, the growth of tort liability has become anti-
thetical to the twin "goals" of compensation and loss-spread-
ing-fewer defendants have insurance, and those who do often
have less coverage. This point is less telling under the incentives-
based justification for tort, as compensation per se is peripheral to
the rationale for liability. But an increase in cost or a reduction in
the availability of insurance will impose economic costs if they are
symptomatic of imperfections in the insurance market that impede
an efficient allocation of risk within the economy. And to the ex-
tent that the tort system causes or exacerbates these imperfec-
tions, Huber has identified another cost that must be weighed
against the benefits of liability."2
Finally, Huber contends that the tort system has adverse re-
distributive consequences. For example, he observes that the cost
of the "insurance" that accompanies the purchase of a product
under strict products liability is the same to each consumer-poor
consumers pay the same price for the product as rich consumers.
Yet, in the event of an accident, rich consumers will be more gen-
erously compensated because their lost income stream is larger. In
this sense, poor consumers "subsidize" insurance for rich consum-
ers. (p 151) Although Huber offers no estimate of the magnitude of
this subsidy, one cannot deny its existence.
In short, Huber persuasively argues that the tort system is im-
perfect, indeed highly imperfect. He is right to question those who
develop the theoretical case for liability in a frictionless, errorless
model that ignores the costs of adjudication and the practical con-
straints upon the operation of legal institutions.3
But the observation that the system is imperfect does not suf-
fice to make the case for reform. While Huber argues that present
tort doctrine leads systematically to excessive liability, he ignores
countervailing factors that tend to produce undercompensation.'4
" See, for example, George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 Yale L J 1521 (1987).
12 Academic debate on the origins of the "insurance crisis" continues. Much of the "cri-
sis" is likely to be transitory, as it reflects the temporary inability of actuaries to assess
liability with confidence, a problem that should abate with time as the insurance companies
accumulate experience. For a theoretical and empirical analysis of how increased uncer-
tainty about the scope of liability may affect the price and availability of coverage, see J.
David Cummins and Patricia M. Danzon, Product Liability Insurance: What Caused the
Shocks in Price and Availability (Unpublished, University of Chicago, 1989).
"S Much the same point is made in David Friedman, Book Review. Economic Analysis
of Accident Law, by Steven Shavell, 97 J Pol Econ 497 (1989).
14 For the view that tort liability systematically undercompensates from the perspective
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The transaction costs of legal actions will dissuade considerable
numbers of injured parties with relatively modest injuries from fil-
ing suit, for example, and damages for fatal accidents are often un-
derstated by the failure of the law to compensate for "death" it-
self.1" Indeed, one of Huber's proposed reforms-abolition of the
collateral source rule (p 193)-would greatly compound the prob-
lem by allowing injurers to escape liability for the harms they
cause to the extent that victims are covered by first-party
insurance.' 6
More importantly, any case for reform must ultimately rest
upon the identification of superior alternatives. It is here that Hu-
ber's analysis falls considerably short.
II.
Torts instructors often draw a distinction between "stranger"
cases and "consensual" cases. Roughly, a "stranger" case arises
when the injury bears no relation to any contractual relation be-
tween the defendant and the plaintiff. The classic stranger exam-
ple is a collision between two vehicles on the highway. Many inju-
ries, however, follow a consensual exchange of goods or services
between the defendant and the plaintiff, and such consensual rela-
tionships are invariably accompanied by some form of contract.
Products liability cases, medical malpractice cases, air crash cases,
workplace injury cases, and many others share this consensual
characteristic.
In stranger cases, the cause of action inevitably sounds in tort
(or some body of law other than contract), as any legal obligation
running from the defendant to the plaintiff must arise by statute
of creating adequate incentives for safety, see W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regu-
lation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, 78 Am Econ Rev Pa-
pers & Proceedings 300, 303 (1988).
" In wrongful death actions, damages are often limited to those sustained by the dece-
dents' survivors and provide no compensation for the harm done to the decedent himself.
Some jurisdictions do allow the decedent's estate to recover for such losses as the present
value of lifetime earnings, but even in those jurisdictions, no compensation is provided for
the decedents' loss of utility in being deprived of the joys of life. This policy leads, in an
economic sense, to systematic undercompensation in wrongful death actions. See Landes &
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 186-89 (cited in note 6).
16 As noted, the incentives-based justification for tort liability suggests that injurers will
make cost-effective investments in safety only if they confront the prospect of liability for
the actual harms they cause. The abolition of the collateral source rule, which provides that
injurers must pay the full amount of compensatory damages even when victims have been
partially compensated by insurance, would reduce the liability of many injurers to an
amount below the level that in theory is necessary to create proper incentives.
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or at common law. But in the consensual cases, the plaintiff will
often have rights of action arising by contract. Indeed, one may
reasonably inquire whether contractual rights of action ought to
afford the exclusive remedy in a consensual case for whatever in-
jury the plaintiff has suffered. At one point in the history of Anglo-
American common law, the courts at least came close to embracing
such a principle."7 But over the last century or so, rights of action
in tort have become increasingly important in many consensual
cases, even to the point where contracting parties sometimes have
considerable difficulty creating an enforceable agreement to curtail
those rights of action.
If a single theme dominates Huber's critique of tort doctrine,
it is that the courts have erred grievously by eviscerating contract
as an effective limitation upon the scope of liability in consensual
cases. His proposals for reform are dominated by "neocontractual
solutions" (for example, p 195) and a "return to contract, built on
open warning and informed consent." (p 216)
The proposition that the courts have in some respects gone too
far in supplementing rights of action in contract with rights of ac-
tion in tort is no doubt correct.' 8 But as Huber recognizes, blind
faith in contract to govern the rights of parties in consensual cases
also has serious failings. The task is to sort cases into two catego-
ries-cases in which the market (i.e., contract) may be expected to
provide adequate incentives for safety, and cases of serious "mar-
ket failure" in which the market is unlikely to provide adequate
incentives for safety. In the latter group, some movement from
contract to tort has considerable theoretical appeal, though, again,
transaction costs or error costs may exceed the prospective bene-
fits, and this issue must be thoughtfully evaluated.
Unfortunately, nowhere does Huber provide serious discussion
of the problems of market failure, or offer any guidance to the
courts regarding the identification of cases in which market failure
is likely to be more or less acute.19 And nowhere does he provide
any theoretical or empirical basis to suppose that market failures
17 See, for example, Winterbottom v Wright, 152 Eng Rep 402 (Ex 1842).
Is Indeed, I have put forth such arguments elsewhere. See, for example, Alan 0. Sykes,
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment
Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv L Rev 563, 600-03 (1988).
19 A number of considerations spring to mind. For example, in the products area, the
more obvious or well known the risk to the consumer, the less likely that serious market
failure will arise. The absence of air bags in a new automobile, for example, and the risks of
smoking, are relatively obvious and well known. Latent design characterisitics, and latent
manufacturing defects, are of potentially greater concern.
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are sufficiently infrequent or insignificant that they may safely be
ignored. As a consequence, his proposals for a return to contract
appear naive and seriously overbroad.
What are the important sources of market failure? 20 The most
obvious cases involve injuries to persons not party to the market
transaction. When a product poses risks not only to purchasers but
to others in the vicinity of the purchaser, an externality arises that
market participants will ignore.21
The market may also fail to provide adequate incentives for
safety if parties to the bargain are ill-informed, or otherwise se-
verely constrained in their ability to evaluate the merits of the bar-
gain due to the costs of doing so or due to some systematic cogni-
tive limitation.22 If consumers are ill-informed about attributes of
products that affect their own safety, for example, they will not
adjust their willingness-to-pay for products in accordance with the
value of the safety-enhancing design changes or quality control
measures instituted by manufacturers. Moreover, even when infor-
mation about product safety is accessible to the consumer, con-
sumer willingness-to-pay may not accurately reflect it. It is not
costless to process information, and consumers may rationally ig-
nore information about low probability harms if the time and en-
ergy required to evaluate its implications and respond to them is
sufficiently great.23 Likewise, consumers may err in their evaluation
20 One largely wrongheaded basis for rejecting contract in favor of tort is the proposi-
tion that disparities in bargaining power between consumers and manufacturers will lead
the manufacturers to offer inefficiently unsafe products. Consider, for example, a perfect
price discriminating monopolist who is the only source of some product that the consumer
desperately wants and is willing to purchase for a tidy sum even if it is inefficiently unsafe.
Suppose further that a design change that costs the monopolist $5,000 would enhance safety
by avoiding accidents with an expected cost of $10,000 to the consumer. Consumer willing-
ness to pay for the product should then rise by $10,000 if the design change is made and the
consumer is informed of it. Even a monopolist will gladly invest $5,000 if it enables him to
extract an additional $10,000 from the consumer. Thus, it is simply not the case that bar-
gaining power disparities systematically destroy the economic incentive to provide cost-ef-
fective safety enhancements in a market populated by well-informed consumers. Rather,
bargaining power will generally be exploited through price.
The existence of market power can pose interesting "second-best" problems for the tort
system, however, because of the monopoly distortion of consumption. For an exposition of
such issues, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Con-
sumer Misperceptions, and Market Power, 14 Bell J Econ 581 (1983).
21 See Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 Am
Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 311 (1988).
212 A useful survey of the theoretical issues, applied specifically to products liability,
may be found in Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 Yale L J 353 (1988).
23 See, for example, Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (John Wiley & Sons, 1957).
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of information due to cognitive limitations upon their ability to
process it accurately. A considerable literature exists regarding the
question whether consumers, workers, homeowners, and others can
properly evaluate the low probability hazards to which they are
exposed. The evidence suggests that in some, though not all, set-
tings, systematic errors are made in the perception and evaluation
of low level risks. 4
The consequences of poor information and misperception are
potentially serious. If willingness-to-pay does not respond to safety
enhancement measures by, say, a product manufacturer, then the
manufacturer will lack a market incentive to provide them. Their
omission reduces the costs of production but does not reduce the
number of customers forthcoming at a given price. For the same
reason, manufacturers may lack the incentive to offer cost-effective
warranty provisions. 5 Finally, if consumers misperceive the risks
associated with a product, they will tend to overconsume it or un-
derconsume it" 6 -overconsume if they underestimate risks, under-
consume if they overestimate risks. Thus, the terms of the contract
between the manufacturer and the consumer will not in general
reflect an efficient bargain. Incentives for safety will be compro-
mised, and the consumption decision will be distorted.
The imposition of tort liability, notwithstanding any contrac-
tual disclaimers of such liability, may in theory provide at least a
partial solution. Consider further the example of manufacturers
and consumers. On the premise that manufacturers are well-in-
formed about the safety attributes of their products, they can fore-
cast accurately the effects of safety enhancement measures upon
the likelihood and severity of accidents, and thus upon the inci-
dence of injuries for which they bear liability. If damages are also
reasonably easy to forecast, manufacturers can then compute a
reasonable estimate of the benefits to them of greater safety. Fi-
nally, if damages are equal to the social cost of injuries,2 7 manufac-
turers' pursuit of profit will lead them to adopt safety measures
24 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, 1982); Peter Asch, Consumer
Safety Regulation at 88-100 (Oxford, 1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Pri-
vate Preferences, 53 U Chi L Rev 1129, 1166-69 (1986). To be sure, some studies of the issue
find that people do a reasonably good job at assessing and evaluating certain low level risks.
See Schwartz, 97 Yale L J at 378-84 (cited in note 22), and sources cited therein.
"I For the view that warranty terms are generally efficient in practice, see George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L J 1297 (1981).
2' That is, inefficiency will arise because price will not equal social marginal cost.
"' Again, the emphasis is on what the manufacturer pays, not what the consumer
receives.
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that are cost-effective from a societal standpoint.
The question whether tort liability will ameliorate the distor-
tion of the consumption decision is more difficult. A variety of con-
siderations suggest that the tort system cannot possibly optimize
the consumption decision in a first-best sense, but it is equally
clear that a movement from contract to tort can ameliorate the
consumption distortion under certain conditions. Suppose that
under "strict liability," the consumer knows that he will receive
full compensation for any harm that occurs. He can then ignore
the risk of injury in formulating his willingness-to-pay. But for the
existence of transaction costs that drive a wedge between what the
manufacturer pays and what the consumer receives, the manufac-
turer would charge a price that included a premium equal to the
expected value of compensation for injuries to consumers. If all
consumers were alike, and if the market were competitive, the re-
sulting equilibrium would reflect the economically proper con-
sumption decision-price would equal social marginal cost, includ-
ing the expected cost of injuries to consumers.
The analysis of "negligence" differs slightly, because negli-
gence leaves certain risks on the consumer (those that arise even
though the manufacturer exercises due care). If the consumer mis-
perceives those risks, some distortion of the consumption decision
remains, although negligence may still be superior to exclusive reli-
ance on contract 8
Of course, the observation that markets may "fail," and that
tort liability may in theory ameliorate the attendant problems,
hardly suffices to support a blanket rejection of contract in favor of
tort. First, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of market
failure. If the problem lies with an initial dearth of information,
the market may offer powerful incentives to provide more. Con-
2' These results may be found in Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J
Legal Stud 1, 17 (Table 1), 21 (Table 2) (1980). Shavell also considers the case of "durable
goods," which require optimization at yet another margin-frequency of use. See id at 22
(Table 3).
Obviously, many complicating factors arise. The market may not be competitive, in
which case the consumption distortion attributable to consumer misperception may aggra-
vate or offset the consumption distortion attributable to market power. See Polinsky & Rog-
erson, 14 Bell J Econ 581 (cited in note 20). Further, consumers will generally differ as to
the probability that they will have an accident, or the damages that they will suffer in the
event of an accident. If all consumers pay the same price for the product, those who are
more accident prone or whose accidents are more costly will tend to overconsume, while
other consumers will underconsume. Finally, because the consumer receives less in compen-
sation than the manufacturer pays in damages, it is impossible to provide full compensation




sider consumer products once again: Manufacturers who can make
relatively safe products efficiently have an incentive to "sell" safety
to the consumer, either directly through salespersons and advertis-
ing or indirectly through signals of product safety (such as the Un-
derwriter's Laboratories seal of approval). 9 Publications such as
Consumer Reports will find an audience. Further, products that
are perceived to have serious safety deficiencies may receive con-
siderable publicity to that effect in the media," and the prospect
of such publicity may provide manufacturers with a considerable
reputational stake in the provision of safety. Finally, it is not nec-
essary that all consumers be well informed. As long as a reasonable
number of informed consumers engage in thoughtful comparison
shopping, safety incentives may be adequate.3 1
Second, tort liability may not be the first-best policy response
to market failure. If the government is to intervene in the market,
government provision of information (for example, the EPA crash
tests for automobiles) may provide a less costly solution with less
risk of error.3 2 Finally, as Huber emphasizes, considerable costs
may attend a movement to tort liability. Error costs, uncertainties,
and the resource costs of the tort system itself must be weighed
carefully in any decision to depart from contract.
In the end, therefore, theory alone can provide no more than a
rough first cut at identifying the circumstances in which a move-
ment from contract to tort is an attractive prospect. The desirabil-
ity of reliance upon the market ultimately turns upon difficult em-
pirical issues, which Huber does little to resolve.
Rather, Huber simply urges a return to contract coupled with
an insistence that sellers inform customers of risks: "The old tort
law perhaps erred in the other extreme, elevating freedom of con-
tract to the point of enforcing deals that were grounded on blind
ignorance all around... Full disclosure should be an ordinary and
" Note further that if manufacturers have reason to believe that consumers overesti-
mate the risks associated with their products, they may have an incentive to contract to
compensate the consumer in the event that the risks materialize. If the transaction costs of
compensation are small enough, the increase in consumer willingness-to-pay will exceed the
total cost of compensation to the manufacturer.
30 To be sure, a spate of successful tort actions will create additional publicity. One
may reasonably question whether the Ford Pinto, for example, would have received nearly
as much adverse publicity in the absence of the opportunity for injured parties to sue in
tort.
tt See Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630, 636-37 (1979).
32 See, for example, Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, The Effi-
cient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J L & Econ 491, 521-31 (1981).
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essential part of fair dealing." (p 211) Yet, what is meant by "full
disclosure?" No matter how much sellers disclose, it is almost al-
ways possible for them to disclose more. The auto manufacturer
who discloses much about the important safety features of the ve-
hicle inevitably omits to mention how certain latent design charac-
teristics (such as the configuration of the gasoline tank in the Ford
Pinto) might affect the probability of serious injury. The pharma-
ceutical manufacturer who discloses the possibility of particular
side effects could conceivably disclose additional information about
their probability. Huber's own discussion of modern litigation over
the adequacy of product warnings also makes the point
nicely-regardless of what a manufacturer discloses, plaintiffs can
point with striking regularity to other pertinent information that
might have been disclosed but was not, and that plausibly might
have affected their decision to use the product. (pp 54-58)
Indeed, to a considerable degree, it was just such an insistence
by the courts upon "full disclosure" that brought about what Gil-
more and now Huber term the "death of contract." 33 Where the
courts at times go awry is in their failure to appreciate that disclo-
sure itself is costly, as is any effort to make use of it, so that genu-
inely "full disclosure" is economically undesirable when its effect
on behavior will be sufficiently small. Likewise, it is foolish to re-
quire sellers to "disclose" things that they do not know-liability
for "non-disclosure" here can have little systematic impact on in-
centives for safety or the quality of consumer information. Ulti-
mately, the task is to fashion an acceptable theory of what consti-
tutes sufficient disclosure. On this point, the courts thus far have
done rather poorly. But Huber does not begin to tackle the diffi-
cult doctrinal issues that must be addressed if the problem is to be
remedied.
Still other difficulties afflict Huber's discussion of "neocon-
tractual" options for tort reform. As a substitute for tort awards,
Huber (borrowing from Jeffrey O'Connell (pp 194-204)) advocates
the use of "neocontractual" agreements to provide compensation
to the injured. For example, much as Federal Express or UPS pro-
vides a fixed indemnity for a lost package absent payment of an
additional premium, the seller of a product or service might do the
same for personal injuries. An air carrier, for example, might con-
33 To be sure, concerns about bargaining power and "contracts of adhesion" also made
the courts reluctant to respect the terms of the bargain. As noted earlier, however, asymme-
tries in "bargaining power," even where they exist by some measure, are not in general a
convincing basis for a rejection of contract. See note 20.
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tract with passengers to provide a fixed payment upon the death of
a passenger in an air crash.
"Neocontractual" compensation for personal injuries would in-
deed avoid various transaction costs of tort litigation. But if the
use of such devices is economically desirable, it is at least some-
thing of a puzzle why the market never offered them to any extent,
even in the days when the courts were much more inclined to re-
spect the bargain than they are presently. Part of the answer no
doubt owes to the fact that the economically appropriate payment
in the event of a personal injury typically varies across customers,
just as individuals differ considerably in the amount of first-party
insurance coverage that they wish to purchase. Part of the answer
also lies in the observation that "neocontractual" solutions have
little appeal except where the seller is prepared to assume "no-
fault" liability, and where the injuries that arise do not raise diffi-
cult causal issues. The costs of litigating fault (or "defect") under a
fault-based (or "defect"-based) contract for compensation would
likely equal the costs of litigating such issues in tort, just as the
costs of litigating causation might be much the same in either re-
gime (consider the pharmaceutical cases, for example). One sus-
pects that the set of cases in which it is sensible for sellers to con-
sider assuming no-fault liability, and in which the causal issues are
simple, is quite small indeed.
III.
While Huber calls for greater trust in the market, he also ad-
vocates greater trust in government regulation. Early on, he la-
ments the fact that "[a]dvance regulatory approval, no matter how
thorough, careful, and complete, counts for nothing definite in the
subsequent lawsuit." (p 48) Later, he contends that "[r]egulators,
quite simply, are better equipped than any jury to make the sys-
tematic risk comparisons on which all progressive choice is based."
(p 215) Hence, much as the violation of a statute or regulatory
standard often results in an easy victory for the plaintiff who is
injured as a consequence, Huber urges that compliance with appli-
cable safety statutes and regulations ought to insulate defendants
from liability.
This suggestion is not novel, and indeed the courts have de-
bated its merits at great length. The usual resolution of that de-
bate, as Huber correctly notes, is the principle that compliance
with pertinent statutes or regulations is evidence in rebuttal of
plaintiff's prima facie case, but is not dispositive (with some excep-
1989] 1167
The University of Chicago Law Review
tions) unless the legislature so provides.3 4 Thus, juries and judges
may find the defendant "negligent," or its product "defective,"
notwithstanding explicit regulatory approval of the defendant's
conduct or product.
The wisdom of this regime turns upon difficult issues of com-
parative institutional competence. Juries unquestionably lack the
technical expertise of regulators. Further, they hear the case only
after a serious injury has occurred, and may thus be tempted to
indulge compassion for the injured at the expense of sound judg-
ment on the legal merits. Trial judges and appellate courts provide
a check on the possibility of error, but only an imperfect check.
Regulators and legislators, however, are hardly above bias and
prejudice themselves. Public choice theory teaches how the legisla-
tive process responds to special interest pressures-well organized
business interests, for example, often triumph over diffuse and
poorly organized consumer interests.3 5 The result may be legisla-
tion that promotes the economic interests of well organized groups
even when accompanied by a net loss to the community as a
whole.3 6 Likewise, the economic theory of regulation suggests that
regulators are often "captured" by the regulated, in part because
regulated entities control the information flow to the regulators,
and in part because -the regulators often aspire to lucrative private
sector positions in the regulated entities following their exit from
public service.
Consequently, the proposition that safety legislation or regula-
tion consistently reflects a principled balancing of the costs and
benefits of safety measures is, at best, dubious. Likewise, it is by
no means clear that legislators and regulators will do a better job
of serving the public interest in safety than the courts, even given
the courts' comparative lack of expertise.
These observations further explain what Huber regards as an
See, for example, W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G.
Owen, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts at 233 (West, 5th ed 1984).
5 The seminal works on public choice theory include James M. Buchanan & Gordon
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (U Mich, 1962); and Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of
Collective Action (Harvard, 1965).
' Legislation to protect domestic markets from international competition provides a
ready set of examples. See, for example, Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Pro-
tectionism, in Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed, Import Competition and Response at 263 (Chicago,
1982).
'3 The seminal works include George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
Bell J Econ 3 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J Econ




inconsistency in the law-the fact that violations of legislative or
regulatory standards are given greater weight by the courts than
compliance with those standards. (p 214) In the products area, for
example, if well organized special interests dominate the legislative
process or "capture" the regulators, legislative and regulatory
safety standards are likely to be too lax."8 Then, although violation
of a legislative or regulatory standard is strong evidence of the de-
fendant's failure to undertake cost-effective safety measures, com-
pliance with that standard by no means establishes the opposite.
This is not to suggest that courts invariably give proper weight
to regulatory compliance in their decisions. Perhaps the regulatory
process at the FDA, for example, is sufficiently protected from spe-
cial interest pressures that little danger of error would arise if
courts gave greater-perhaps dispositive-weight to compliance
with FDA regulations in products actions. But how do we know as
an empirical matter that special interest pressures are of little con-
cern at a particular agency? Huber makes no effort to show that
particular regulatory agencies are reasonably insulated from spe-
cial interest pressures. Nor does he make the case for a bright line
rule that assumes away the problem of special interest pressures
on the premise that on average the problem is minor.
Further, questions invariably arise as to whether regulated en-
tities have withheld information from the regulators, or whether
new information developed subsequent to initial regulatory action
has received proper regulatory consideration. Thus, it is not at all
difficult to imagine scenarios in which compliance with regulation
should indeed receive little weight. Once again, the task is to sort
cases in a theoretically sound manner that also provides useful
guidance to the courts. Huber does not do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Liability is worth reading, if only for its entertaining though
occasionally loose account of the important trends in twentieth
century tort law. Where it fails is in its attempt to show that the
system is seriously inferior to some feasible alternative. Huber's
one-sided critique of tort does expose its imperfections, but omits
to weigh them in any systematic way against its virtues, and ulti-
mately fails to elaborate appealing reforms. Given the complexity
of tort law and the wide variety of circumstances to which it ap-
33 Of course, this proposition presupposes some degree of market failure that warrants
legislative or regulatory intervention in the first place.
1989] 1169
1170 The University of Chicago Law Review [56:1153
plies, it would be surprising indeed if no improvements could be
made. Yet, Liability does little to identify them.
Nonetheless, because of its broad based call for curtailment of
plaintiffs' rights of action, Liability will no doubt be lauded by in-
terests in the business community that perceive themselves be-
sieged by ever expanding tort liability. It is important that aca-
demics maintain greater distance from the debate. Those who do
will find Liability to be of interest, but will also react to its central
thesis with skepticism.
